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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: INSECURITY 
ASSETS IN THE RISING VIRTUAL AGE 
OF E-COMMERCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Virtual worlds are computer-based, simulated environments that 
incorporate real-world representations of objects into an interface 
where users can interact with one another, typically through the use of 
an “avatar”1 that is graphically visible to other users.2 Virtual worlds 
are “persistent and dynamic” because they exist independent of users’ 
home computers and constantly change even when users are offline.3 
At the forefront of innovative virtual realities is the online application 
Second Life, developed by Linden Labs and launched on June 23, 
2003. In Second Life, a resident assumes the role of an avatar in a 
virtual world where he can personalize his appearance, own property 
and real estate, shop in a virtual economy, operate a storefront, social-
ize with other players, and acquire numerous forms of virtual, intangi-
ble property that has real value.4 To buy land and items in Second 
Life, players can acquire “Lindens,” Second Life’s currency, with 
U.S. dollars.5
  
 1 An “avatar” is defined as: “An on-line, real-time graphical representation 
of an interactive computer service user visible to other users accessing (or sharing) 
the same virtual three-dimensional world. Depending on its implementation, an Ava-
tar may communicate by a combination of body movements (such as walking, gestur-
ing and making facial expressions), text and speech, all of which may be seen and 
heard by other occupants of the virtual world. Avatars may grasp, possess and ex-
change objects with other Avatars and entities within the virtual world.” Steven 
Hetcher, Virtual China, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 469, 473 n. 21 (2008) 
(quoting 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET AL., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES & THE LAW: FORMS 
& ANALYSIS APP. E. (2008)). 
 2 Ned Kock, E-Collaboration and E-Commerce in Virtual Worlds: The 
Potential of Second Life and World of Warcraft, 4 INT’L J. E-COLLABORATION, Jul.-
Sept. 2008, at 1 (discussing the emergence of virtual worlds used for entertainment 
and business purposes). 
 3 Juliet M. Moringiello, What Virtual Worlds Can Do for Property Law, 62 
FLA. L. REV. 159, 169 (2010) [hereinafter Moringiello, Virtual Worlds]. 
 4 What is Second Life?, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/whatis  
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). 
 5 Id. 
 Second Life, unlike its predecessors, is a “non-scripted” 
world in which users design content and transform the virtual world 
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through their creations.6 In 2003, Linden became the first virtual de-
veloper to recognize property rights in its’ users virtual creations.7 
The revised Terms of Service allows subscribers to “retain full intel-
lectual property protection for the digital content they create, includ-
ing characters, clothing, scripts, textures, objects and designs.”8
Although many onlookers see virtual property and applications, 
such as Second Life, as “just a game,” this type of virtual property is 
poised to become the next generation of e-commerce.
 
9 Disputes in 
this virtual world have already led to litigation. In Bragg v. Linden 
Research, a Pennsylvania lawyer and Second Life player sued Linden 
for an improper “conversion” of his virtual assets, an alleged breach 
of the game’s terms agreement.10 The case was settled out of court. 
Similarly, the plaintiffs in Eros, LLC v. Simon, brought intellectual 
property claims relating to their creation of the first in-world sex bed, 
and the sale of other adult-themed items to other avatars online. The 
defendant, another Second Life user, copied the plaintiffs’ items by 
manipulating a security flaw in Second Life’s code.11
In an effort to expand the availability of financing, businesses and 
creditors have already tapped into nontraditional, yet valuable, elec-
  
While these peculiar lawsuits could be accredited to over-
enthusiastic gamers with an excess of time and money, one could also 
view the creation of virtual markets as a precursor to an evolution on 
the Internet that assigns value to intangible assets. Although business-
es and individuals are not rushing to use pixilated items and virtual 
real estate as means of securing collateral (yet), the evolution of Inter-
net virtual worlds signifies the effect of the Internet upon traditional 
notions of property law, securities, and the types of assets used to ob-
tain financing.  
  
 6 Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, supra note 3, at 170 (discussing the authentic 
and realistic nature of the virtual world in Second Life). 
 7 Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Crea-
tions (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14 
(announcing Second Life’s revised Terms of Service that allows users to retain com-
plete intellectual property rights for the digital content created by that user). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Kock, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that “[t]rade in virtual worlds is 
essentially a more sophisticated version of e-commerce,” and have “the potential to 
be the new infrastructure providers for B2C [business-to-consumer] and, particularly, 
C2C [consumer-to-consumer transactions]”); See also Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, 
supra note 3. 
 10 Complaint, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (No. 06-cv-4925). 
 11 Complaint, Eros, LLC v. Simon, No. 1:07-cv-04447 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 
2007). 
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tronic and intangible assets as a means of securing collateral.12 Com-
panies have increasingly used intangible assets such as intellectual 
property, domain names, and other payment rights and monetary obli-
gations to secure financing.13 In the case of a typical Internet compa-
ny, a domain name and other intangible assets may constitute its only 
valuable assets.14 Domain names are often the only and most valuable 
asset of an Internet company and can be a lucrative means for Internet 
start-up companies to secure financing.15 For example, over the last 
10 years, an e-commerce company bought Business.com for $7.5 mil-
lion in stock and cash,16 an online jewelry retailer bought jewelry.com 
for $5 million,17 and Bank of America acquired loans.com for $3 mil-
lion.18
Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code have attempted to 
follow these developments by expanding the scope of multiple articles 
to account for electronic assets and means of perfecting, filling and 
realizing security interests.
  
19
  
 12 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the 
Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 
1368 (1998-2000) (describing the evolution of Article 9 from the use of personal 
property financing to modern methods for securing collateral. “Other types of intang-
ible property have become important sources of wealth in the ensuing decades.”); see 
also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble 
with Perfection—Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 37, 41-42 (2002) (“The recent downtown of the e-commerce sector has revealed 
that for most Internet companies filing for bankruptcy, the most valuable remaining 
assets are intangible assets.”) [hereinafter Nguyen, Commercial Law]. 
 13 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2007) [hereinafter Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property]. 
 14 Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Securing 
and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255, 261-62 (2000) (“Unlike typical brick and mortar com-
panies, the assets of the typical Internet company are often “virtual” consisting of 
intellectual property such as trademarks, trade names, copyrights, and patents, and 
general intangibles.”). 
 15 See Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]here is a 
lucrative market for certain generic or clever domain names . . . [that are] extremely 
valuable to Internet entrepreneurs…. A domain name with significant value on the 
open market certainly would be an attractive . . . target for a judgment creditor.”). 
 16 Greg Johnson, The Costly Game for Net Names, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2000, at A1. 
 17 Silvia Sansoni, It Was Good While it Lasted: Internet Hotshots Reflect on 
Where all the Money Went, FORBES, Dec. 25, 2000, at 36. 
 18 Robert Frank, Who Will Buy Wealth.com, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 3, 2009, 
8:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2009/06/03/who-will-buy-wealth.com. 
 19 See Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The 
(Ir)Relevance of (In)Tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 119 (2007) [hereinafter Mo-
ringiello, False Categories]. 
 The most recent revision of the U.C.C. 
expanded enforcement of secured collateral in intangible property by 
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extending the scope of Article 9 to govern the sale of “payment intan-
gibles,” otherwise defined as “a general intangible under which the 
account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”20
The problems faced by creditors seeking to enforce judgments 
against debtors by foreclosing on intangible collateral are best illu-
strated by a hypothetical presented by Juliet M. Moringiello. In her 
hypothetical, eSnowshoes, Inc. is a small company selling snowshoes 
online.
 This 
expansion, however, fails to reach intangible assets other than mone-
tary obligations that can be used as secured collateral, including do-
main names and various forms of intellectual property. 
21 To start up its business, the company borrowed $100,000 
from Commercial Bank by granting a security interest in its inventory, 
accounts receivable and general intangibles, including their domain 
name and eSnowshoes storefront in the virtual world “Second Life.”22 
Due to an unusually warm winter, eSnowshoes defaults on its loan 
and Commercial Bank seeks to foreclose on the collateral pursuant to 
the security agreement on its loan.23 Although the bank can use the 
self-help provision of Article 9 to foreclose on the inventory and other 
collection remedies to obtain payment on the accounts receivable, its 
ability to reach the Internet domain name and virtual real estate is 
uncertain because neither asset falls within the purview of a “payment 
right” or “monetary obligation” as defined by U.C.C..24 As such, the 
bank must rely on the default provision of U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1), 
which provides that a secured party “(1) may reduce a claim to judg-
ment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security interest, or 
agricultural lien by any available judicial procedure.”25 Even if 
Commercial Bank is able to secure a judgment against eSnowshoes, 
because of the significant variance on state law remedies, traditional 
remedies such as replevin, garnishment and execution may be un-
available for a “general intangible” asset such as a domain name or 
virtual store.26
The purpose of this Note is not to revisit the arguments of whether 
virtual “property” is property at all.
  
27
  
 20 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2002). 
 21 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 119. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61). 
 25 Id. § 9-601(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 26 See infra Part III(B). 
 Rather, this Note starts from the 
baseline idea that all virtual and intangible assets are, in fact, property 
 27 For a discussion on domain names and virtual assets as property, see gen-
erally Moringiello, Virtual Worlds, supra note 3. 
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and focuses on how to revise Article 9 to create a consistent and uni-
form foreclosure remedy that can reach unique intangible assets.  
In Part II of this Note, I describe the history and purpose of the 
U.C.C. in modernizing and facilitating commercial transactions. In 
particular, I focus on the evolution of the U.C.C. and Article 9 to in-
corporate the use electronic assets as a means of secured collateral by 
various industries. Through this process, I demonstrate how the secu-
ritization and loan participation industries heavily influenced the 
drafting of Revised Article 9 and how former revisions of the U.C.C. 
have allowed the financial industry to vastly expand the methods and 
means in which they finance business transactions.  
Part III focuses on the inadequacies of current Article 9 foreclo-
sure remedies and state laws in dealing with the enforcement of gen-
eral intangibles. It will demonstrate how the drafting committee omit-
ted a foreclosure remedy for all intangible assets by tailoring the revi-
sions of Article 9 narrowly to payment intangibles and other monetary 
obligations. In addition, I will show how the myriad of state laws go-
verning the enforcement of judgments against intangible property are 
inconsistent, confusing, and often incapable of reaching general intan-
gibles. Even if a state has enacted a statute that allows a creditor to 
reach intangible assets, those statutes are difficult to locate and often 
require judicial interpretation to reach general intangibles.28
The U.C.C. was created in the mid-twentieth century out of a 
growing need for certainty and uniformity in the law governing com-
mercial transactions.
  
Finally, Part IV proposes a revision to Article 9 that bridges the 
gap between the U.C.C.’s foreclosure remedies and state law. By ana-
logizing general intangibles to intangible investment securities under 
Article 8 of the U.C.C., and looking to state law mechanisms that have 
allowed creditors to reach intangible assets, I will show how a flexible 
remedy can be created for all general intangibles by invoking the 
equitable powers of the court. 
I. HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
A. Generally 
29
  
 28 See generally, Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19. 
 29 Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. 
L. REV. 367, 369 (1957) ([Certainty and uniformity] is of particular value to the busi-
ness or bank which is negotiating with an outfit of gigantic financial resources, be-
cause either inaccessibility or obscurity in the governing law can offer false color to 
bargaining positions….”) (emphasis in original). 
 A myriad of state laws and remedies governed 
the creation and enforcement of security interests prior to the ratifica-
72 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:1 
tion of Article 9 of the U.C.C. in 1962.30 Creditors utilized a wide 
variety of security devices such as “chattel mortgages, conditional 
sales, trust receipts, factor’s liens, and assignments of accounts re-
ceivable.”31 The type of collateral subject to these devices varied 
widely and was determined by state statutes and common law.32 The 
laws dictating the classification, creation, and enforcement of security 
interests varied dramatically from state to state causing “confusion 
and redundancy [in] multi-state transactions.”33 Grant Gilmore, one of 
the principal drafters of the U.C.C., once described pre-Code personal 
property security laws as “closely resembling that obscure wood in 
which Dante discovered the gates of hell.”34
The Pre-U.C.C. legal scheme was seen by legal scholars and 
commercial actors as “embodying a per se prejudice against secured 
financing.”
 
35
The growing complexity of financing transactions forced leg-
islatures to keep piling new statutory provisions on top of our 
inadequate and already sufficiently complicated nineteenth-
century structure of security law. The results of this continu-
ing development were increasing costs to both parties and in-
creasing uncertainty as to their rights and the rights of third 
parties dealing with them.
 This concern was expressed in the 1972 version of the 
Official Comment to § 9-101: 
36
The expansion of the commercial economy, the increased use of new 
types of collateral including intangible assets such as accounts receiv-
able, and the growing gaps and variance in state laws provided a fur-
 
  
 30 See Nguyen, Commercial Law, supra note 12, at 43-44. 
 31  Id. (citing U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972)). 
 32 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory 
Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REV. 199, 202-03 (2000). 
 33 Id. at 203. See also U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) (“Pre-Code law recognized 
a wide variety of security devices, which came into use at various times to make 
possible different types of secured financing. Differences between one device and 
another persisted, in formal requisites, in the secured party’s rights against the debtor 
and third parties, in the debtor’s rights against the secured party, and in filing re-
quirements, although many of those differences no longer served any useful func-
tion.”). 
 34 Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and The Uniform Com-
mercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 
(1981). 
 35 Lupica, supra note 32, at 203. 
 36 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt (1972). 
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ther impetus for a unified structure governing the creation and en-
forcement of security interests.37
To remedy this, the drafters “intended that Article 9 would be the 
single source of law on security interests.”
 
38 Article 9 provides “a 
comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in per-
sonal property and fixtures,” although it does not replace the use of 
pre-U.C.C. security devices and remedies.39 Article 9 divides collater-
al into three primary categories goods, quasi-tangible property, and 
intangible property. Further, it promulgates the procedures required 
for a creditor to perfect an interest in each type of collateral; and de-
signates the rights and duties of debtors and creditors upon default.40
Article 9’s general provisions, consistent with the U.C.C.’s over-
all goals, are intended to facilitate the use of secured credit.
 
Thus, the ratification of Article 9 by all 50 states created a unified 
mechanism in which a debtor can grant a security interest in virtually 
any type of asset with value. 
41 The 
Article’s provisions lessen transaction costs by making it easier to 
create and perfect security interests and to establish priority, in case of 
default, over other claimants.42 Secured financing has also become 
fundamental to the economy because it “reduces the debtor’s misbe-
havior, increases the availability of credit, promotes investment, and 
enhances production.”43
  
 37 See Lupica, supra note 32, at 204 (“A further impetus for the development 
of Article 9 was the idea that the unification of the disparate bodies o law creating and 
governing security devices would remove some of the impediments to further prolife-
ration of collateralized transactions.”). 
 38 RICHARD F. DUNCAN & WILLIAM H. LYONS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS: WORKING WITH ARTICLE 9 § 1.04[1] (9th ed. 2004). 
 39 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2002). 
 40 See generally U.C.C. § 9-101 (2002). 
 
 41 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1361 (“Revised Article 9 also 
facilitates secured credit by expanding its reach beyond that of the Former Article…. 
Article 9’s coherent and rational system offers advantages over operating under 
common-law or other statutory rules….”). 
 42 See id. at 1360-61 (providing examples to illustrate how revisions to Ar-
ticle 9 make it “easier and less expensive to create and perfect security interests and to 
achieve priority over competing claimants”). See also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Im-
pact on Securitization of Revised U.C.C. Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947, 950-51 
(1999) (“Establishing clear and pragmatic rules for perfection and priority of the 
transfer of covered financial assets will minimize transaction costs . . . filing for both 
types of transfers will forestall litigation attempting to second-guess that determina-
tion if the originator in the securitization transaction eventually goes bankrupt; and 
sales of covered financial assets no longer will have to be perfected under state com-
mon law procedures that are often costly and impractical.”). 
 43 Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 19. 
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Although the overall goal of Article 9 was to provide a compre-
hensive, uniform structure for commercial transactions, “[t]he drafters 
of the U.C.C. never intended it to cover all areas of commercial 
law.”44 In particular, the common law supplements the U.C.C. by fill-
ing in gaps that were intentionally left out by the drafters in order to 
account for novel developments.45 For example, the U.C.C. does not 
define “property” or “possession,” leaving it to the courts to interpret 
the meaning of these terms.46
Despite the courts’ retained authority, revisions to the U.C.C. 
demonstrate a growing trend of incorporating electronic methods and 
intangible property into commercial transactions. For example, Ar-
ticles 3, 7, and 8, which govern the transfer of negotiable instruments, 
documents of title, and investment securities, have evolved from the 
traditional system of requiring the transfer of intangible rights by the 
manual transfer of paper, to allowing a party to convey these rights 
without the use of any physical document.
 In doing so, courts retain the ability to 
shape the development of new property rights into the structure of the 
existing code. 
47
The revision of Article 9 was primarily influenced by the emer-
gence of new commercial practices that, at the time of the U.C.C.’s 
original drafting, did not exist or were not highly prevalent.
 The recent revision of 
Article 9 continued this trend of evolving with technology. 
B. The Revision of Article 9 
48 These 
include the increasing propensity of creditors to use intangible assets 
as a form of secured collateral.49
  
 44 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 122. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-408 cmt. 3 (2002) (“Other law determines whether 
a debtor has a property interest (‘rights in the collateral’) and the nature of that inter-
est.”); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 771 (5th 
ed. 2000) (“The drafters of the UCC . . . declined the futile task of defining possession 
in the Code.”). 
 47 See U.C.C. §§ 3-102, 7-101, 8-101 (2002); see also Moringiello, False 
Categories, supra note 19, at 123. 
 48 Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A 
Brief History, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 180 (1999) (“As commercial practices 
evolved, the fit between Article 9 and commercial practices no longer was so nearly 
perfect.”). See also David Frisch, Revised Article 9: A Primer for the General Practi-
tioner, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 813, 821 (2001) (“In order to accommodate the growing 
number and the economic importance of securitization transactions, the reach of 
Revised Article 9 has been expanded considerably to pull in a much broader spectrum 
of sales of receivables.”). 
 49 See discussion supra Part I. 
 In 1990, the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the U.C.C. and its sponsors, The American Law Institute 
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and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, established a committee to issue a report regarding suggested 
revisions to Article 9.50
During the two decades since [Article 9 was last revised], the 
secured credit markets have seen continued growth and un-
precedented innovation. In addition, many hundreds of judi-
cial decisions applying Article 9 have been reported and a 
large volume of commentary on Article 9, both scholarly and 
practice-oriented, has emerged. Moreover, the enactment by 
Congress of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ... has had a 
profound effect on secured transactions. These developments 
have led to a strong consensus ... that although Article 9 is 
fundamentally sound, serious consideration should be given to 
the revision of some of the Article’s provisions.
 The Article 9 committee provided the follow-
ing: 
51
Because Article 9 was based on the commercial practices at the time 
of its original drafting, the old language was not a perfect fit for the 
needs of emerging securitization practices.
 
52
For example, asset securitization is a way for current financial in-
stitutions to “transform[] financial assets into marketable securities.”
  
53 
The assets are transferred to an entity created specifically for this pur-
pose, called a “special purpose vehicle,” which then issues securities 
based on the revenue stream that is produced by the assets.54 At the 
time of the redrafting of Article 9, and still currently today, securitiza-
tion is “‘the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. credit markets’ 
and increasingly a major part of foreign credit markets.”55 Under for-
mer Article 9, however, transfers of many of these securities were not 
covered by the U.C.C., because they constituted sales of general in-
tangibles which were not within the scope of the Article at the time.56
  
 50 U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2002). 
 51 PERMANENT ED. BD. FOR THE U.C.C., PEB STUDY GROUP U.C.C. ART. 9 
REP. 2 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
 52 See Shupack, supra note 48, at 180. 
 53 WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 162 (7th ed. 2007). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 947 (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of 
Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996)). 
 
 56 Former Article 9, in addition to governing secured transactions, also go-
verned the sale of accounts and chattel paper, which were commonly used in securiti-
zation. U.C.C. § 9-102(b) (2002) (stating that Article 9 applies to “any sale of ac-
counts or chattel paper.”). Former Article 9, however, did not cover payment intan-
gibles and other promissory notes, which were also used by the securitization indus-
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Hence, there was immense pressure by the asset securitization indus-
try to ensure that all receivables, including payment intangibles and 
promissory notes, were governed by the U.C.C.57
Conversely, the loan participation industry, which sold “participa-
tions in a debtor’s obligation to repay a loan,” and also deemed a gen-
eral intangible, had diverging interests from the securitization indus-
try.
 
58 Bringing the sale of all general intangibles under the U.C.C. 
would subject loan participation transactions to the filing requirements 
under Article 9, which would increase the underlying costs of the en-
tire industry.59 Thus, the drafters were forced to come to a compro-
mise, which provided for the perfection of payment intangibles, a dis-
tinct category of “general intangibles,” automatically.60
The revision expands the scope of Article 9 and simplifies the 
recognition and enforcement of secured collateral in several ways. 
First, Revised Article 9 expands coverage of security interests to de-
posit accounts as original collateral, commercial tort claims, and sales 
of rights to payment.
  
61 Thus, “payment intangibles” and “promissory 
notes” were now under the scope of Article 9.62
The revision also improves two other areas of great importance, 
namely, filing and enforcement.
 This was important 
because enforcement of security interests in payment intangibles had 
been, up to this point, exclusively dealt with by state courts and the 
common law.  
63 Because perfection of a security 
interest for payment intangibles now occurs automatically, there is no 
need to incur additional expenses to comply with the common law 
procedures of the state where the seller was located.64
  
try. See Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 949-50; see also WARREN & WALT, supra note 
53, at 163 (“A case in which a retail chain sells its accounts to a securitization entity 
would be covered as sales of accounts, but if the receivables sold were obligations on 
loans former Article 9 did not apply because this was a sale of general intangibles.”). 
 57 WARREN & WALT, supra note 53, at 163. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(42), 9-312 (2002). 
 61 Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1361. 
 62 Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 949. 
 63 Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1362 (“The new filing rules . . . clarify 
various questions left unanswered by Former Article 9, resolve issues left in doubt or 
in conflict under the Former Article by the courts, and impose specific requirements 
on filing offices to increase efficiency, accuracy, and speed.”). 
 64 See Schwarcz, supra note 42, at 949 n.9 (describing how automatic perfec-
tion reduces transaction costs associate with common law filing procedures). 
 This revision 
satisfied the objectives of the loan participation industry, which did 
not want to incur the additional expense associated with the filing 
requirements of the U.C.C. To the extent that perfection of a security 
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interest in collateral is accomplished by filing, “Revised Article 9 
contains several provisions that promote efficiency and uniformity in 
the operations of filing offices,” which help to reduce expense.65 Re-
vised Article 9 also provides an extensive revision of the enforcement 
mechanisms of collection and strict foreclosure to provide foreclosure 
remedies that cover the new category of payment intangibles.66
The evolution of more complicated and sophisticated forms of 
collateral is arguably the result of the success of Article 9 in bringing 
uniformity to other forms of secured transactions.
 
67 Indeed, Article 9 
has often been referred to as the “crown jewel” of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.68 When new practices for property financing emerged, 
therefore, it was not surprising that there was pressure to bring the 
sale of general intangibles for money due and other intangible colla-
teral under the ambit of the U.C.C.69
Although Revised Article 9 provides a uniform system for the 
creation and perfection of all general intangibles, the foreclosure me-
chanisms of Article 9 were specifically tailored to the new categories 
of “payment intangibles,” which were carved out of the broader cate-
gory of general intangibles.
  
II. FORECLOSING ON NON-”PAYMENT 
INTANGIBLE” ASSETS – THE MISSING LINK 
70
For instance, a debtor that owns the rights to a domain name can 
grant a security interest because the debtor has “rights in the collater-
 The expansion of the definition of “col-
lateral” to include “general intangibles” in Revised Article 9 effective-
ly brought the transfer of all general intangibles as collateral for a loan 
under the U.C.C., but went no further to ensure that the foreclosure 
remedies could properly apply to general intangibles that are not pay-
ment obligations.  
  
 65 Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1382. 
 66 See infra Part III(A). 
 67 Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1397 (“[T]he very success of Article 9 
has resulted in a substantial increase in the sophistication of secured transactions since 
the early years of the UCC.”). 
 68 Id. at 1401. 
 69 Id. at 1368. Although Article 9 traditionally covered only secured transac-
tions, the sale of accounts and chattel paper were included because “[c]ommercial 
financing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so conducted that the 
distinction between a security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sale of such proper-
ty is therefore covered . . . whether intended for security or not.” Former U.C.C. § 9-
102(1)(b) cmt. 2 (1972). This same rationale was used to bring the sale of payment 
intangibles and promissory notes under Revised Article 9. See also Schwarcz, supra 
note 42, at 948-49. 
 70 See infra Part III(A). 
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al,”71 and a general intangible is a category of collateral under Re-
vised Article 9.72 A secured party can perfect its interest in the secured 
collateral by filing a financing statement.73
Upon default, a secured party has a variety of Article 9 mechan-
isms to recover the value of the debt owed. The secured party “may 
reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, 
[or] security interest[s] . . . by any available judicial procedure.”
 Thus, although the U.C.C. 
enables creditors to establish a security interest in any general intangi-
ble, intangibles that do not relate to a payment right or monetary obli-
gation fall outside the repossession and collection remedies of Article 
9. This leaves the enforcement of non-payment intangibles such as 
domain names, intellectual property, and virtual property to common 
law mechanisms including execution and garnishment, which vary 
significantly from state to state. 
A. U.C.C. Foreclosure: Self-Help, Collection & Strict Foreclosure 
74 The 
secured party may exercise the right to take possession of the collater-
al pursuant to judicial process (typically, through a replevin action), or 
by taking possession of the collateral through “self-help” methods 
without judicial process if it “proceeds without breach of the peace.”75 
After taking possession, the secured party can sell the collateral in a 
public or private disposition and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction 
of the debt as long as the disposition is commercially reasonable.76 In 
the case of a right to payment, Revised Article 9 modified the collec-
tion remedy to allow creditors to collect from persons otherwise obli-
gated to pay the debtor, and apply these proceeds to the underlying 
debt.77 Alternatively, the secured party may exercise the right to 
“strict foreclosure” and keep the collateral in full or partial satisfaction 
of the debt.78 All of these methods “are cumulative and may be exer-
cised simultaneously.”79
  
 71 U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2002). Collateral is defined as “the property subject 
to a security interest….” Id. § 9-102(a)(12). 
 72 Id. § 9-102(3). 
 73 Id. § 9-310(a). 
 74 Id. § 9-601(a)(1). 
 75 Id. § 9-601(a)-(b). 
 76 Id. § 9-610(a)-(c). 
 77 Id. § 9-607. 
 78 See id. § 9-620(a). 
 79 Id. § 9-601(c). 
 None of these mechanisms, however, as ex-
plained below, provide a method of obtaining intangible assets other 
than payment intangibles without looking to state law remedies. 
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1. Default and Repossession 
The repossession remedy under U.C.C. § 9-609 is unworkable for 
intangible assets because it is requires the secured party to take physi-
cal possession of the collateral. Pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-609, a secured 
creditor may take possession of the collateral after default either pur-
suant to judicial process or by self-help if “it proceeds without breach 
of the peace.”80 Although Article 9 does not limit the repossession 
remedy to tangible assets,81 and “possession” is not defined in the 
U.C.C., commentators and leading authorities generally agree that the 
repossession remedy is limited to tangible assets.82 One way to ex-
pand this remedy to cover intangible assets would be to expand the 
scope of this provision to allow the creditor to take possession or exert 
control over the collateral. In this way, if the creditor has protected his 
right to exert control over the intangible collateral through either a 
prior agreement with a third party responsible for the transfer of the 
intangible, or by having a means by which the debtor can be denied 
access to the intangible, the creditor can proceed by self-help and dis-
pose of the collateral pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-610.83
The collection remedy was significantly expanded in Revised Ar-
ticle 9 to provide a foreclosure mechanism for payment intangibles by 
allowing secured parties to exercise collection and enforcement rights 
against third persons – not just the account debtor – after default.
 
2. Collection and Enforcement Rights 
84 
Creditors seeking to enforce their security interests do not need to rely 
on the repossession provision of Article 9. Instead, they can rely on 
the collection provision of U.C.C. § 9-607(a), which states: “[i]f so 
agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party: (1) may notify 
an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make 
payment or otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the 
secured party.”85
  
 80 Id. § 9-609(a)-(b). 
 81 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 126. 
 82 Id. at 126-27. 
 83 An example of “self-help” using the eSnowshoes hypothetical would be if 
the bank required access to the account information to the virtual store as part of the 
underlying agreement. If eSnowshoes defaulted on the loan, the bank could manually 
change the online account information, thereby denying the debtor access to the vir-
tual store, and then proceed with the disposition of the collateral pursuant to U.C.C. § 
9-610. Self-help remedies, however, would still be limited to actions that do not 
“breach the peace.” 
 84 U.C.C. § 9-607 (2002). 
 85 Id. § 9-607(a)(1). 
 Because the definition of “account debtor” was ex-
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panded under the revision to include the person obligated on an ac-
count, chattel paper, or a general intangible,86 payment intangibles 
and other contract rights are subject to the collection remedy under 
revised Article 9.87
The effect of U.C.C. § 9-607 is that a secured creditor can enforce 
an intangible payment right by forcing debtors to pay the creditor ra-
ther than the original debtor. In doing so, the account debtors can only 
discharge their obligation by paying the secured creditor. If payment 
is made to the original debtor that is not for the benefit of the secured 
party, account debtors “risk having to pay twice.”
 
88
These remedies, however, do not allow secured creditors to en-
force security interests posited in intangible assets that are not pay-
ment rights or monetary obligations. Because an intangible asset, such 
as a domain name or some types of intellectual property, is neither 
tangible nor a “monetary obligation” as defined by Article 9,
 
 89
The changes to strict foreclosure promulgated under Revised Ar-
ticle 9 do provide a limited remedy to all general intangibles, but this 
remedy is inadequate to protect creditors facing uncooperative deb-
tors. Strict foreclosure in Revised Article 9 provides that “a secured 
party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obliga-
tion . . . if: (1) the debtor consents to the acceptance under subsection 
(c); [and] (2) the secured party does not receive, within [20 days], a 
notification of objection….”
 the 
secured creditor cannot rely on the collection remedy to foreclose on 
the asset after default. 
3. Strict Foreclosure 
90 In order to expand the remedy of strict 
foreclosure to payment intangibles, Revised Article 9 removed the 
requirement of possession in non-consumer transactions.91
  
 86 Id. § 9-102(a)(3); see also G. Ray Warner, Lien on Me: Default and Fo-
reclosure Under Revised Article 9, 19-4 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (2000). 
 87 Warner, supra note 86, at 20. 
 88 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 127 (using the eSnow-
shoes hypothetical to describe the right of a secured party under U.C.C. § 9-607 to 
request payment from an account debtor to satisfy the amount owed by the original 
debtor). 
 89 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2002). 
 90 Id. § 9-620(a)(1)-(2). 
 91 See id. § 9-620 cmt. 7. 
 Thus, this 
option is now available for intangible collateral and tangible collateral 
that is not yet repossessed. There is nothing in the code that limits this 
remedy to general intangibles that are monetary obligations. Addi-
tionally, the remedy of strict foreclosure was also expanded to allow 
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for the foreclosure of the collateral in partial satisfaction of the debt 
owed, and not just the full amount.92
Strict foreclosure, however, only provides for satisfaction of a 
debt upon default if the debtor is cooperative or is unresponsive, 
which is demonstrated by the requirement that the debtor must either 
consent or fail to object within 20 days.
 
93
A creditor seeking to foreclose on a true general intangible is 
forced to rely on the default provision found in U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1) 
that allows a secured creditor to use state law remedies traditionally 
used by unsecured creditors at common law. Section 9-601(a) states: 
“A secured party: (1) may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or 
otherwise enforce the claim, [or] security interest . . . by any available 
judicial procedure.”
 Hence, a creditor seeking to 
foreclose on intangible property where the debtor is uncooperative 
would still have no remedy under Article 9. 
4. Default Provision: “Any Other Judicial Procedure” 
94 This allows a secured creditor to use remedies 
such as execution and garnishment to enforce a security interest. 
However, these remedies, as demonstrated later in this Note, vary 
dramatically from state to state and may not adequately address this 
“gap.”95
The exclusion of a foreclosure remedy for all general intangibles 
is the consequence of the Drafting Committee revising Article 9 for a 
narrow purpose – to provide a more workable framework for asset 
securitization involving payment streams and the right to receive 
payments that were increasingly utilized by financial institutions.
 
5. Drafting Committee Oversight 
96 In 
1992, the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group Report recom-
mended that Article 9 be amended to “include within its scope sales of 
general intangibles for the payment of money. However, the Drafting 
Committee should ensure that the expanded scope does not embrace 
sales of receivables as to which regulation by Article 9 would be im-
practical or unnecessary.”97
  
 92 Id. § 9-620(a). 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. § 9-601(a)(1). 
 95 See infra Part III(B). 
 96 See Shupack, supra note 48, at 168. 
 97 PERMANENT ED. BD. FOR THE U.C.C., PEB STUDY GROUP U.C.C. ART. 9 
REP. 43 (Dec. 1, 1992). 
 Asset securitization was previously go-
verned by non-uniform state law because the definition of “account” 
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in the old Article 9 was limited to receivables arising out of the sale or 
lease of goods or out of services rendered.98
Grant Gilmore, one of the principal drafters of the U.C.C., envi-
sioned a uniform commercial code that did not distinguish between 
contract rights, accounts, and general intangibles.
 
99 His criticisms, 
however, did not persuade the Study Group and Drafting Committee, 
which did not “consider[] including the sales of all general intangibles 
within the scope of Revised Article 9.”100 The primary reason for ex-
cluding the sale of all general intangibles under Revised Article 9 was 
that such an expansion, which would necessarily include the sale of 
patents, permits, copyrights, trade secrets, partnership interests, or the 
rights to performance in any contract, was too far-reaching and “ap-
pealed to no one.”101
Although a creditor may be unable to use the default provisions of 
Revised Article 9 to enforce a security interest in a general intangible, 
other state law remedies—those typically used by unsecured creditors 
to enforce judgments at common law—may provide relief. Notably, a 
creditor may enforce its interest by resorting to “any available judicial 
procedure” pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1). This does not, however, 
always provide the creditor with a clear remedy because state laws 
vary significantly.
 Hence, there was little thought or discussion to 
ensure that the modified foreclosure remedies that provided creditors 
with clear methods of enforcement of security interests against pay-
ment intangibles would be able to reach all general intangibles. 
B. Inadequacy of State Law Remedies 
102 Resorting to the common law also undermines 
the primary goal of the U.C.C. and Article 9: to create a uniform sys-
tem for commercial transactions, which reduces the transaction costs 
associated with having inconsistent provisions in various jurisdic-
tions.103
  
 98 Shupack, supra note 48, at 168-69 (discussing the definition of “account” 
in the version of Article 9 prior to the 2002 revision). 
 99 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 383 
(Little, Brown & Co. 1965) (“The three-headed classification, being not only unne-
cessary but harmful, should be done away with at the earliest possible moment.”). 
 100 Shupack, supra note 48, at 170.  
 101 Id. 
 102 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 131 (“The absence of 
clear remedies for creditors with security interests in electronic assets renders the 
U.C.C. nonuniform, as the secured creditor must look to other state laws, which are 
far from uniform, for its remedies.”). 
 Often, even if common law courts theoretically have an in-
 103 Id. (discussing how the nonuniformity of state law remedies “deviate[s] 
from the U.C.C.’s purposes of simplifying, modernizing and clarifying the law go-
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creased flexibility to deal with emerging technology and innovations, 
the courts have either declined to do so, or have failed to adequately 
address these issues because of their adherence to outdated notions of 
tangibility.104
Replevin, the traditional method of obtaining direct control over 
property, has been inadequate to enforce security interests in intangi-
ble property rights. This is because replevin is only viable when the 
property is “tangible and specifically identifiable.”
 
1. Inapplicability of Replevin and Conversion 
105 Hence, state 
courts applying their respective replevin statutes have consistently 
denied relief when the property sought is an intangible asset.106
Conversion, a similar remedy, has been inconsistently enforced by 
state courts. For example, in Kremen v. Cohen, the plaintiff brought a 
claim of conversion against NSI after a third-party facilitated the frau-
dulent transfer of the domain name “sex.com” by forging the owner’s 
signature.
 
107 The court granted summary judgment in favor of NSI 
and held that a domain name, as an intangible, could not be the sub-
ject of a conversion action.108 The Ninth Circuit eventually reversed, 
and held that a domain name was protected by California conversion 
law because California did not follow the strict requirement that an 
intangible be merged into a document.109
Common-law courts are also inconsistent when intangible assets 
are coupled with a security interest in tangible property. States that 
  
  
verning commercial transactions and making uniform the law among the various 
jurisdictions”).  
 104 Id. at 132 (“[T]he courts left with the task of fashioning rules governing 
both rightful and wrongful transfers of electronic property are doing a poor job of 
providing guidance to courts deciding commercial disputes.”). See also discussion 
infra Part IV(D)(3). 
 105 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 
6:32 (rev. ed. 2010); see also Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 128 
(“These judicial procedures also developed along lines based on the tangibility or 
intangibility of the assets involved . . . . Replevin, as noted above, allows a secured 
creditor to gain possession only of tangible personal property.”). 
 106 See Walther v. Cent. Trust Co., 590 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) 
(affirming the dismissal of a replevin claim, because the depositor’s interest in a bank 
account did not constitute specific personal property); see also Mai Basic Four, Inc. v. 
Generic Bus. Solutions, Inc., No. 9908, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 2, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
16, 1990) (“The law of replevin has long held that only tangible and corporeal objects 
may be replevied . . . . [S]hares in a corporation, because they are understood to be 
intangible rights, cannot be the subjects of a replevin action.”). 
 107 Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 108 Id. 
 109 See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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traditionally reject replevin or similar remedies as a means of reaching 
general intangibles may allow such remedies when intangibles are 
grouped with tangible collateral. For instance, in Star Bank v. Mat-
thews, an Ohio Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
grant permanent possession of “all inventory, accounts receivable, 
equipment, furniture, and general intangibles” in a replevin action.110
Alternative state law remedies, such as garnishment and execu-
tion, do not provide meaningful alternatives to enforce a security in-
terest in general intangibles. The Connecticut Supreme Court criti-
cized its own state’s collection statutes in Burchett v. Roncari, stating: 
“ancient writs of execution have become so encrusted with procedural 
barnacles that frequently they are not suited to the needs of modern 
society.”
 
As such, some courts allow a creditor to reach general intangibles if 
they are incorporated into a broader security agreement that includes 
tangible property. 
2. Garnishment and Execution 
111 A writ of execution, also known as a writ of fieri facias, is 
a common law remedy used by creditors to seize a debtor’s property 
to satisfy a judgment. After winning a judgment against the debtor, 
the creditor has the right to a writ of execution, which is delivered to a 
sheriff, who levies the property by taking actual or constructive pos-
session.112 If the property is in the hands of a third party or is intangi-
ble, such as wages or bank accounts, a creditor can proceed by gar-
nishment, in which the sheriff serves a notice of garnishment on the 
person holding the debtor’s property, and that party must turn over the 
debtor’s property, or risk being liable for the entire judgment.113 His-
torically, garnishment was used in “medieval times to compel the ap-
pearance of a foreign merchant” in cases where a writ of execution 
could not reach the debtor’s property.114
Although creditors can seize tangible property through execution, 
“there is no universally available mechanism by which to gain control 
over intangible property.”
 
115
  
 110 See Star Bank v. Matthews, 759 N.E.2d 1274, 1275, 1281 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2001). 
 111 Burchett v. Roncari, 434 A.2d 941, 942 (Conn. 1980). See also Juliet M. 
Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look to 
the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 130 (2003) (“The law of enforcement of judgments 
comes from a confusing conglomeration of state legislation, much of it antiquated.”) 
[hereinafter Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names]. 
 112 See Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 111, at 131. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 132. 
 115 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 129. 
 In Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro In-
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ternational Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court noted that: “Historically, 
certain types of intangible, intellectual property have not been subject 
to levy and sale under execution.”116 The Court declined to expressly 
classify the domain name at issue as “form of intellectual property,” 
and instead, the plaintiff was prevented from executing the writ of 
fieri facias under the Virginia statute because the domain name was 
intangible property that was inseparable from the service provided.117 
This is consistent with the traditional common law principle that a 
sheriff must take physical possession of the debtor’s property in order 
to institute a successful levy.118
Whether garnishment statutes can reach intangible assets such as a 
domain name or virtual property is also unclear. The language of gar-
nishment statutes varies dramatically across jurisdictions. Some sta-
tutes appear to allow a creditor to reach any property, while others 
narrowly construe categories of garnishable property that seem to 
exclude general intangibles.
 
119 In Pennsylvania, for instance, a gar-
nishment action is proper against anyone who has “custody, posses-
sion or control” of the debtor’s property, which seemingly allows an 
action to seize a general intangible.120 Similarly, in Illinois a creditor 
can bring a garnishment action against anyone who “is indebted to the 
judgment debtor” or “has in his or her possession, custody or control 
any other property belonging to the judgment debtor, or in which the 
judgment debtor has an interest….”121 Other states, such as Massa-
chusetts, only allow creditors to bring a garnishment action against a 
person who holds “goods, effects, or credits of the [debtor],”122
  
 116 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 n.13 (Va. 
2000). 
 117 Id. at 86 (“[W]hatever contractual rights the judgment debtor has in the 
domain names at issue in this appeal, those rights do not exist separate and apart from 
NSI’s services that make the domain names operational Internet addresses….A con-
tract for services is not ‘a liability’ as that term is used [under Virginia law] and hence 
is not subject to garnishment.”).  See also Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 
(E.D. Va. 1999) (deferring judgment on whether the writ of fieri facias could be ap-
plied to domain names, but noting “[t]here are several reasons to doubt that domain 
names should be treated as personal property subject to judgment liens”).  
 118 See Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 111, at 131. 
 119 See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 129 nn.67-68 (com-
paring a Pennsylvania statute that “allow[s] a garnishment action against anyone who 
has ‘custody, possession or control’ of the debtor’s property” to a Virginia statute that 
“allow[s] only a ‘liability’ to be garnished”). 
 120 PA. R. CIV. P. § 3101(b)(2) (2010). 
 121 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-701 (West 2003). 
 122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 246, § 20 (West 2004). 
which 
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some early courts interpreted as requiring “actual possession” and 
thus, precluding the ability to garnish intangible assets.123
The jurisdictional variance of state law execution and garnishment 
remedies for intangible assets is even clearer in the context of domain 
names. As discussed above, in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro In-
ternational, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court held that a domain name 
could not be garnished under Virginia law because the domain name 
was inextricably linked with the service provided via the Internet 
site.
 
124 Conversely, in Online Partners.com, Inc. v. Atlanticnet Media 
Corporation, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California recognized a domain name as “intellectual property 
[that] may be attached under the law”125in a trademark infringement 
action. In order to satisfy the judgment, the court exercised an equita-
ble lien over the domain name and transferred it to the plaintiff.126
If a creditor is unable to reach a security interest through the tradi-
tional methods of replevin, execution or garnishment, a creditor’s bill 
is a common method to foreclose on intangible collateral. A creditor’s 
bill is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]n equitable suit in 
which a judgment creditor seeks to reach property that cannot be 
reached by the process available to enforce a judgment.”
 
These decisions help to illustrate the problem of wide-spread inconsis-
tency in common law remedies for intangible assets, leaving creditors 
unable to predict the enforceability of actions against debtors in pos-
session of valuable domain names. 
3. The Creditor’s Bill 
127 Through a 
creditor’s bill, a creditor may “request that the court order the defen-
dant to sell the intangible property or assign it to satisfy the judg-
ment.”128
  
 123 See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 129-30 (discussing 
Jordan v. Lavin, 66 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 1946) an older case where the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court required “actual possession” by a third party for the garnishment 
statute). 
 124 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86. 
 125 Online Partners.com, Inc., v. Alanticnet Media Corp., No. Civ.A.C98-
4146SIENE, 2000 WL 101242, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000). 
 126 Id. 
 127 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (9th ed. 2009).  
 128 Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 111, at 133 (citing DAN 
B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.4 (2d ed. 1993)). 
 Even though a creditor’s bill is an equitable remedy, state 
statutes typically proscribe the scope and ability of courts to utilize the 
creditor’s bill to seize assets otherwise not available by garnishment 
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or execution.129 For instance, in Ohio, in order to obtain a creditor’s 
bill a claimant must typically show that the debtor does not have suf-
ficient assets “subject to levy on execution” to satisfy a judgment.130
Although a creditor’s bill is capable of reaching intangible assets, 
including intellectual property, rights to payment, and other forms of 
intangibles,
 
In other words, a creditor’s bill is a remedy of last resort that may be 
exercised only when all other attempts to enforce the judgment have 
failed or are otherwise unavailable. 
131 the remedy is still fraught with difficulties such as val-
uation of intangible assets,132 method of disposition and sale (if or-
dered by the court to satisfy a judgment), and inconsistency in state 
statutes.133
  
 129 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2333.01 (West 2007) (“When a judg-
ment debtor does not have sufficient personal or real property subject to levy on ex-
ecution to satisfy the judgment, any equitable interest which he has in real estate as 
mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise, or any interest he has in a banking, turnpike, 
bridge, or other joint-stock company, or in a money contract, claim, or chose in ac-
tion, due or to become due to him, or in a judgment or order, or money, goods, or 
effects which he has in the possession of any person or body politic or corporate, shall 
be subject to the payment of the judgment by action.”). 
 130 Teri Rasmussen, Reaching a Judgment Debtor’s Patents and Other In-
tangible Property Through a Creditor’s Bill, OHIO PRACTICAL BUSINESS LAW (Oct. 
10, 2009), http://www.ohiopracticalbusinesslaw.com/2009/10/articles/ 
creditors-rights/reaching-a-judgment-debtors-patents-and-other-intangible-property-
through-a-creditors-bill/. 
 131 See, e.g., In re Estate of Mason, 849 N.E.2d 998, 1003-04 (Ohio 2006) 
(allowing a creditor’s bill to seize interests of heirs and legatees in an estate action); 
Olive Branch Holdings, L.L.C. v. Smith Tech. Dev., L.L.C., 909 N.E.2d 671 681-83 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (using a creditor’s bill to obtain rights to a patent in which the 
creditor did not have a security interest); Lakeshore Motor Freight Co. v. Glenway 
Indus., 440 N.E.2d 567, 569-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (using a creditor’s bill to en-
force the judgment in a breach of contract claim). 
 132 Moringiello argues that a judgment lien approach to enforce judgments 
against intangibles is “not ideal because it does not provide a mechanism for selling 
the intangible property to realize its value.” Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, 
supra note 111, at 144. The same problem applies here. Assigning the asset or enforc-
ing a judicial determination of the value of the asset does not have safeguards to en-
sure the realization of an asset’s maximum value like a disposition sale under U.C.C. 
§ 9-610. 
 133 See id. at 133 (noting that a “mechanism for the seizure of intangible prop-
erty is not universally available”). 
 Even if creditors are capable of enforcing judgments 
against intangible assets using a creditor’s bill, the uniformity of Ar-
ticle 9 that proscribes the rights and obligations of parties and the 
means of disposition in order to maximize the value of the collateral is 
preferable and beneficial for both debtors and creditors. 
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III. REVISING ARTICLE 9: PROVIDING A UNIFORM 
FORECLOSURE PROVISION 
Legal commentators and academic scholars have advanced a 
number of proposals to deal with the existing disparities in the com-
mon law treatment of intangible assets. These include creating a 
“Judgment Lien Act” to extend judgment liens to cover all property 
including intangibles;134 adapting the common law remedies of gar-
nishment for domain names and other intangible assets;135 expanding 
the definition of intellectual property in the Bankruptcy Code to in-
clude trademarks and general intangibles;136 and expanding the tradi-
tional notions of “property” to eliminate distinctions between tangible 
and intangible assets.137 None of these proposals, however, provide a 
uniform framework or foreclosure remedy that is sufficiently broad to 
cover all intangible assets. Specifically, the passage of a “Judgment 
Lien Act” still leaves creditors without a mechanism to realize the true 
value of intangible property,138
The enforcement of corporate securities, and the evolution of the 
U.C.C. in handling the enforcement of those securities, illustrates how 
a foreclosure mechanism for general intangibles can be achieved un-
der the preexisting U.C.C. framework. Historically, shares of corpo-
rate stock and other securities were not subject to execution and other 
 revising the Bankruptcy Code only 
narrowly expands the assets creditors can reach, and hoping that 
judges in common law courts will uniformly change their interpreta-
tions of garnishment statutes or notions of tangibility is unrealistic.  
As such, the drafters of the U.C.C. should look to pre-existing 
models that have consistently allowed the enforcement of a security 
interests against general intangibles, and incorporate those provisions 
into a broader foreclosure remedy that creditors can use universally 
across jurisdictions.  
A. Investment Securities Model: Intangibles Reached by “Legal 
Process” 
  
 134 See Charles Shafer, The Virtual Clerk’s Office: A Proposed Model Judg-
ment Lien Act for the Computer Age, 15 J.L. & COM. 295 (1995-1996). 
 135 See Vita Zeltser, The Specter of the Debt Collector and the Uncharted 
Domain: The Case for Treating Domain Names as Garnishable Property, 12 DIGEST 
59, 78-80 (2004). 
 136 See Alexis Freeman, Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Deb-
tors Can Grant Them and Lenders Can Take Them in This New Type of Hybrid Prop-
erty, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 853, 888-89 (2002). 
 137 See generally Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, for a discus-
sion of the interplay between intangible assets and traditional property concepts. 
 138 See Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names, supra note 111, at 144. 
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traditional remedies that required physical possession.139 By the mid-
1800s, states began enacting laws that allowed creditors to reach se-
curities, and by the early 1900s, many states had adopted the Un-
iformed Stock Transfer Act (“USTA”), which stated that paper shares 
were the physical manifestation of the stock holdings and hence capa-
ble of seizure.140 The USTA was superseded by Article 8 of the 
U.C.C. in the early 1960s which provided that “levy was effected by 
manual seizure of the shares.”141 This remedy, however, was ineffec-
tive if the paper shares could not be physically located or destroyed. 
As a result, the most recent version of Article 8 provides an alterna-
tive method, allowing a creditor to “‘seize’ a security by taking action 
against the person in a position to control the transfer of that securi-
ty.”142
(d) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security for which 
the certificate is in the possession of a secured party…may be 
reached by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party.
 
The language of Article 8-112 provides (in relevant part):  
(b) The interest of a debtor in an uncertificated security may 
be reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the issu-
er…. 
(c) The interest of a debtor in a security entitlement may be 
reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the securities 
intermediary with whom the debtor’s security account is 
maintained….  
 
143
Moreover, subsequent court decisions interpreting Article 8 have al-
lowed a creditor to gain access over a debtor’s security that could not 
be readily attached because it was intangible, by invoking the equita-
ble aid of the court.
 
144
  
 139 Id. at 137. 
 140 Id. at 138-39. 
 141 Id. at 140. 
 142 Id. 
 143 U.C.C. § 8-112(b)-(d) (2002). 
 144 See, e.g., Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. Zavecz, No. H028585, 2005 WL 
3485660 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2005). 
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B. The Texas Model: Turnover for Assets Otherwise Unavailable by 
Ordinary Legal Process 
Certain state laws regarding turnover remedies for intangible as-
sets also provide a model framework which can be incorporated into 
Article 9. The Texas Model is an example of a turnover statute that 
was incorporated as a “safety net” for general intangibles that are oth-
erwise not covered by other state law remedies such as replevin, gar-
nishment and execution. The Texas Statute allows the court to do the 
following:  
(1) order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt proper-
ty that is in the debtor’s possession or is subject to the deb-
tor’s control, together with all documents or records related to 
the property, to a designated sheriff or constable for execu-
tion;  
(2) otherwise apply the property to the satisfaction of the 
judgment; or  
(3) appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of 
the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the 
judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the judg-
ment.145
In a turnover proceeding, however, the court’s jurisdiction is limited 
to property that “(1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordi-
nary legal process; and (2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, 
or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.”
 
146
Under the Texas model, the remedies provided by the turnover 
statute are cumulative and do not require that a judgment creditor first 
exhaust all remedies such as attachment, execution and garnishment 
before obtaining relief.
  
147 Because intangible property may not be 
subject to execution and the discovery of parties to garnish is not al-
ways feasible, practitioners in Texas have used § 31.002 to reach in-
tangible property assets.148
  
 145 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(b)(1) (West 2004).  
 146 Id. § 31.002(a)(1)–(2). 
 147 See, e.g., Matrix, Inc. v. Provident Am. Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 665, 668 
(Tex. App. 1983). See also Donna Brown, Post Judgment Remedies, Judgment Liens, 
Garnishment, Execution, Turnover Proceedings, Receiverships Under the DTPA and 
“Other Stuff” 36 (May 2010), available at, http://www.dbrownlaw.com/ 
postjudgement.doc. 
 148 See Brown, supra note 147. 
 Further, “[a] judgment debtor may even be 
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ordered to assign a cause of action to a judgment creditor, as a cause 
of action is a property interest which is subject to turnover.”149
Similar to the turnover statute, an Article 9 remedy should specify 
that the court has the power to assign or transfer control of the interest 
of an intangible asset to either a receiver with the authority to take 
possession—similar to a sheriff that executes a writ of fieri facias—or 
to the creditor himself. However, unlike the Texas turnover statute, an 
Article 9 remedy would use the existing mechanisms in Article 9 to 
dispose of the collateral in order to maximize its potential value.
 
150
(1) may reach the security interest by legal process 
against the debtor
 In 
addition, it is not necessary for the Article 9 remedy to appoint a re-
ceiver with the power to “seize” the collateral and sell the asset be-
cause Article 9 already contains a number of provisions that specify 
the creditor’s obligations when in control or possession of the colla-
teral, which properly protects the debtor from any wrongdoing or mi-
shandling of the asset by the creditor. As such, the court should direct-
ly transfer control of the asset over to the creditor who can proceed 
with liquidation of the asset pursuant to the standard provisions of 
Article 9. 
C. Turnover Provision for Article 9’s Collection and Enforcement 
Remedies 
Below is a model revision that merges the provisions of U.C.C. § 
8-112, which allows creditors to reach intangible investment securi-
ties, with the turnover provisions that have been enacted by various 
state legislations: 
§ 9-607. Collection and Enforcement by Secured Party. 
(b) [Judicial enforcement of general intangibles] If a secured 
party holds an interest in a general intangible other than a 
payment intangible, in any event after default, the secured 
party: 
151
  
 149 Id. at 37.  
 150 See U.C.C. § 9-610 (2002).  
 151 This provision is analogous to U.C.C. § 8-112(b)-(d) that specifies the 
parties whom the proper action can be brought against.  It also clarifies the substan-
tive right of the creditor to seek judicial enforcement of a security interest against a 
debtor for a general intangible. 
 or against a third party interme-
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diary in possession, control, or with whom the general 
intangible is maintained;152
(2) is entitled to aid from a court of competent juris-
diction to assign the interest or transfer control of col-
lateral to the creditor;
  
 153
(c) [Enforcement of a security interest not readily reached by 
other legal process] A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a 
general intangible is entitled to aid from a court of competent 
jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in reaching the gener-
al intangible or in satisfying the claim by means allowed at 
law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be 
reached by other legal process.
 and  
(3) may dispose of collateral under Section 9-610. 
154
This revised provision explicitly creates a substantive right for a 
secured creditor to enforce his interest in a general intangible; speci-
fies the proper parties with which to file suit; allows an action against 
a third party intermediary in the case in which the virtual property is 
maintained by a third party; and allows intangible assets to be reached 
through the equitable powers of the court. In applying this provision 
to the domain name or virtual store in the E-snowshoes hypothetical, 
Commercial Bank would know who to initiate legal proceedings 
against and how to reach these assets. For the domain name, the Bank 
could get a court order pursuant to (b)(1) against NSI, forcing them to 
 
[Current §§ 9-607(b)-(e) shall be modified to (d)-(g), respec-
tively] 
  
 152 This provision is analogous to U.C.C. § 8-112(c) that provides a remedy 
for securities that are maintained by a third party securities intermediaryGeneral in-
tangibles, such as the virtual store in the Second Life scenario, are often held or main-
tained by a third party. This provision allows the creditor to reach the asset controlled 
by a third party similar to how a creditor may reach an intangible securities invest-
ment maintained by a broker. 
 153 This provision is a merger of the general language of U.C.C. § 8-112(e) 
and the Texas turnover provision statute that extends to the court the power to order 
the assignment or transfer control of the collateral.  
 154 This provision is a replica of U.C.C. § 8-112(e) that allows creditors to 
reach investment securities through the equitable powers of the court when it cannot 
readily be obtained through legal process. This also allows creditors the right to en-
join a debtor or third party from transferring an interest before a court ordered as-
signment or disposition. This language is similar to the Texas turnover statute which 
only applies when the property “cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary 
legal process.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a)(1). 
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transfer control of the domain name to the Bank for disposition pur-
suant to Sections (b)(3) and 9-610. For the virtual store, Commercial 
Bank could obtain a court order compelling Second Life to transfer 
control of the asset to the Bank for disposition also pursuant to (b)(3). 
In other cases of intellectual property, generally, Commercial Bank 
could bring an action against E-snowshoes and get a court order com-
pelling them to sign over the interest similar to a creditor’s bill. What 
the state courts chose to call this action thereby becomes irrelevant, 
similar to enforcement actions that are made under Article 8 that al-
lows “seizure” of investment securities. In any case, revised section 
(c) specifically grants the court the means in equity to enforce the 
security interest against the debtor. This also allows the creditor to 
obtain an injunction to prevent any actions by the debtor of avoiding 
enforcement, such as assigning the interest or control of the collateral 
to someone else before it is seized. 
Adopting a foreclosure remedy as described above would bring 
about several unique advantages when compared to today’s patchwork 
of state law remedies. First, it would allow creditors to use the dispo-
sition procedures codified in Section 9-610 to maximize the value of 
the intangible asset. The comments to Section 9-610 note: “[t]his sec-
tion encourages private dispositions on the assumption that they fre-
quently will result in higher realization on collateral for the benefit of 
all concerned.”155 Further, Section 9-610 “does not restrict disposition 
to sales; [the] collateral may be sold, leased, licensed, or otherwise 
disposed,” which also seeks to maximize the potential value of the 
asset.156
Second, Article 9 contains substantial protections for debtors to 
prevent unreasonable seizure or disposition of collateral. For example, 
when disposing of collateral, creditors must ensure that “[e]very as-
pect. . . including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, 
[is] commercially reasonable.”
 
157 Additionally, aggrieved debtors can 
enforce the remedial provisions of Article 9 against creditors for all 
violations of the Article, allowing a debtor to obtain an injunction, 
equitable relief, or damages for a creditor’s non-compliance.158 Article 
9 also proscribes the rights of the debtor after seizure of the collateral. 
If the collateral is seized, the debtor may redeem it by paying the full 
amount outstanding on the loan before disposition.159
  
 155 U.C.C. § 9-610, cmt. 2.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. § 9-610(b). 
 158 See id. § 9-625(a)-(g). 
 159 See id. § 9-623(a)-(c). 
 The debtor sub-
94 JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 2:1 
sequently retains any remaining proceeds after the outstanding loan 
and costs of preparation are deducted from the sale.160
Finally, adopting a uniform foreclosure mechanism in Article 9 
will facilitate the financing of unique assets which, like domain names 
and virtual real estate, may not fall into traditional categories of colla-
teral that are enforceable by state law. The history of the U.C.C. 
shows that the uniformity brought by adoption of a Uniform Code 
increased the overall availability of commercial credit and fostered 
new innovative methods of financing.
 
161
First, the main purpose and history of the U.C.C. show that the 
original enactment and later revision of Article 9 was done, by and 
large, to accommodate emerging business practices.
 Although it is hard to im-
agine that virtual property will serve as secured collateral for the fi-
nancing of businesses in today’s world, a turnover-like provision will 
still allow creditors the freedom to securitize any collateral that has 
value.  
D. Responding to Objections 
Although the official comments to Article 9 do not explicitly state 
any justifications for limiting the expansion of general intangibles to 
only payment rights and monetary obligations, comments by members 
of the drafting committee and observations by commentators in the 
field suggest several reasons that may have factored into that decision 
and represent potential objections to any expansion of Article 9. 
1. Lack of a Commercial Need to Expand Article 9 
162 As of today, 
however, few intangible assets fall outside the parameters of a pay-
ment right or monetary obligation,163
However, the emergence of Internet businesses has dramatically 
increased the use of general intangibles as collateral. Because online 
 and even fewer are valuable 
enough to be used as secured collateral in financing arrangements. 
Hence, it can be argued that the need for an expansion of Article 9 
beyond “payment intangibles,” is premature because the finance in-
dustry does not widely use non-payment intangibles, such as “virtual 
stores” in Second Life, as collateral for loans. 
  
 160 See Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 23 
(citing U.C.C. § 9-615). 
 161 See supra Part II. 
 162 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 123 (“The articles of the 
U.C.C. that govern specific types of intangible property developed to accommodate 
business practices in various industries.”). 
 163 Id. at 136 (“Most of the known intangible assets before the advent of the 
Internet fell into two categories, intellectual property rights and payment rights.”). 
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businesses generally do not have the same level of tangible collateral 
as their material counterparts, they rely more heavily on intangible 
assets such as domain names, intellectual property, and other general 
intangibles to secure financing.164 There is little argument that domain 
names can acquire substantial value.165 In one high-profile case, a 
plaintiff was awarded $65 million in damages for the misappropria-
tion of the “sex.com” domain name.166 The same domain name was 
also said to have been sold for $12 million in early 2006.167 Using 
intellectual property as a means of secured financing has also become 
a routine practice for many businesses.168 In the past few decades, 
“the proliferation of intellectual property as collateral in secured fi-
nancing has spread across many industries,”169
Moreover, the overall purpose of the U.C.C. is to facilitate se-
cured credit. Virtual property, even if it exists only on a small scale 
today, can sustain real economic value in applications such as Second 
Life. Any property that contains value is proper for a security interest, 
and expanding the types of collateral that is available to creditors will 
facilitate the use of those types of assets in secured financing. Even if 
the infrastructure of a “virtual market” for property does not yet exist, 
the advent of the Internet has shown how rapidly the value of intangi-
ble assets can change.
 as lenders realize the 
value that intangible assets hold. 
170
The drafters of the U.C.C. exercised extreme caution in expanding 
the scope of Article 9 to general intangibles to avoid any unintended 
effects that an expansion might have on other industries. As explained 
in Part II, the drafters were concerned about the effect that Revised 
Article 9 would have on the loan participation industry, and also ex-
 By adopting a general foreclosure mechan-
ism for intangibles, lenders will be assured that new forms of valuable 
assets can be reached upon default, which will incentivize their wil-
lingness to allow new types of assets to be used as collateral in financ-
ing. 
2. Allowing a General Remedy for Intangibles is Too Expansive 
  
 164 See discussion supra Part I. 
 165 See discussion supra Part I; see also Zeltser, supra note 135, at 79 
(“[D]omain names can be used as an investment. A $35 dollar registration fee can 
blossom into millions, as it did with sex.com. Indeed, [the] clever registrant obtained 
a profit of 20,000,000%.”). 
 166 See Kermen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 167 Sex.com is Said to be Sold for About $12 Million to Escom, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2006, at C9; see also Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 151. 
 168 See Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 18. 
 169 Id. at 19. 
 170 See supra Part I. 
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pressed doubt that an expansion of the code would actually influence 
lenders to extend additional credit.171 Although certain departments of 
financial institutions were eager to bring payment intangibles into 
Article 9, particularly those that handle securitization, “the practical 
impediments that might arise from conditioning perfection on the fil-
ing of a financing statement” weighed heavily on the loan participa-
tion markets.172
The consequences of an overbroad revision are also demonstrated 
by commentators’ criticisms of Article 9’s extremely broad definition 
of a “general intangible,” which by its terms, necessarily includes all 
forms of intellectual property.
 By allowing for automatic perfection of the security 
interest upon attachment, the drafting committee was able to alleviate 
the industry’s pragmatic concerns while enabling the sale of payment 
intangibles to be incorporated into Article 9. 
173 Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen criti-
cizes the approach that Article 9 has taken with respect to the collate-
ralization of intellectual property because it lacks transparency.174 In 
other words, by providing an extremely broad definition of a general 
intangible, the U.C.C. increases the risk that debtors who are unfami-
liar with the intricacies of Article 9 may inadvertently subject their 
intellectual property to attachment.175 Since a general intangible is 
defined as “any personal property, including things in action,”176 cop-
yrights, patents, and trademarks are easily included within this catch-
all residual category.177 Hence, a debtor reading a security agreement 
prepared by the creditor would see that the security agreement in-
cludes “general intangibles” without realizing that this category is 
broad enough to include all forms of intellectual property.178
These concerns, however, are not realized by merely adding a fo-
reclosure remedy for all general intangibles. The concern of the Draft-
ing Committee was primarily to avoid bringing the sale of all general 
 
  
 171 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1364-65. 
 172 Id. at 1371. 
 173 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2002) (“‘General intangible’ means any personal 
property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial 
tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, 
letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before 
extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.”). 
 174 Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 5. 
 175 Id. at 29-37; see also Shupack, supra note 48, at 170 (“Given the defini-
tion of general intangibles, virtually any sort of intangible property could be a general 
intangible. A patent, a governmental permit, a copyright, a trade secret, some partner-
ship interests or the right to a performance under any sort of contract could be ac-
commodated within its capacious scope.”). 
 176 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2002). 
 177 Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 33. 
 178 Id. 
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intangibles under the scope of Article 9.179 Providing a foreclosure 
remedy for all general intangibles does not expand the scope of Ar-
ticle 9 in that respect. Article 9 already governs the transfer of general 
intangibles as collateral generally because the definition of collateral 
has been expanded to include “general intangibles” and can be per-
fected by filing a financing statement. For example, although the sale 
of intellectual property falls within the residual category of “general 
intangibles” and is not governed by the U.C.C., Article 9 has been 
recognized as the uniform mechanism in which to grant a security 
interest in intellectual property.180
Finally, the general approach of the U.C.C.’s drafters has been to 
allow courts to interpret the code to adapt to novel innovations and 
new technology.
 The existence of the strict foreclo-
sure option under Article 9 also shows that a foreclosure remedy for 
general intangibles is possible without bringing the sale of general 
intangibles under the U.C.C. Thus, Article 9 is capable of governing 
the formalities in establishing securities as collateral without bringing 
the actual sale of all types of those securities within its reach. 
Providing for a clear method of foreclosure of an intangible asset 
other than a payment obligation will do nothing more in the existing 
regime of secured transactions than allow creditors to use Article 9 as 
a default remedy. Beyond the benefits flowing to creditors, this is also 
beneficial to debtors who will be certain of their rights upon disposi-
tion of the collateral, and can use the remedial provisions of U.C.C. to 
force the creditor’s compliance with the Article’s safeguards. 
3. State Common Law is Preferable to Adapting Remedies to Modern 
Technology 
181 Some commentators argue that the common law is 
better than legislation for adapting to changes in the industry.182
  
 179 See supra Part II(B). 
 180 See, e.g., In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that Article 9 governs the recording of security interests for patents); 
Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 B.R. 606, 610 (D. Mass. 2000) (holding that 
“the Lanham Act does not preempt the U.C.C.’s filing requirements and … the per-
fection of a security interest in a trademark is governed by Article 9”); In re Roman 
Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. 940, 944 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (“The perfection of a 
security interest under a state act is governed by Article 9 unless the state act provides 
its own method of perfection.”) aff’d 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Nguyen, 
Collateralizing Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 27.  
 181 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 131. 
 182 See generally Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the 
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 308, 317 (2002). 
 This 
perspective is also included in U.C.C. § 1-103(b), which states: 
“[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform 
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Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law 
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and 
agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its 
provisions.”183 This section also states: “[The Uniform Commercial 
Code] must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies….”184 Thus, while the drafters of the U.C.C. 
saw the need for uniformity in state law, they also recognized a need 
for some deference to common law courts who can (arguably) adapt 
existing laws to new technology and modern business practices.185
Providing a “turnover” foreclosure remedy in Article 9 does not 
compromise this flexibility. My proposal for a Revised Section 9-607 
merely states that a creditor “may reach the security interest by legal 
process,” similar to the general provisions of Article 8 regarding the 
enforcement of interests in intangible investment securities.
 
186 Moreo-
ver, although “control” is defined under the U.C.C. in Article 8187 and 
various provisions for perfecting the security interests in certain types 
of intangibles in Article 9,188 possession is still left for the state courts 
to define. The foreclosure remedies of Article 9 are also cumulative, 
which allows the secured creditor the flexibility to use common law 
remedies available to unsecured creditors through the default provi-
sion of Section 9-601.189
Further, state courts have already failed to properly adapt com-
mon law remedies to new technologies and modern practices.
 
190 As 
one commentator explains, “people have difficulty extricating the 
intangible asset from the contract that conveyed the property right in 
that asset.”191 Courts that have interpreted the common law writs cling 
to notions of tangibility, which “hinder[s] the development of the 
property law components of commercial law.”192 Because it would be 
burdensome to revise the Uniform Commercial Code every time a 
new, valuable type of asset form develops,193
  
 183 U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2002). 
 184 Id. § 1-103(a). 
 185 See Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 131 (“The approach 
of the U.C.C.’s drafters—to allow courts to interpret the code language in light of 
changes in business practice—remains relevant today, even as new electronic assets 
are created”). 
 186 See U.C.C. § 8-112(a)-(e) (2002). 
 187 See id. § 8-106. 
 188 See id. §§ 9-104-107. 
 189 Id. § 9-601(c). 
 190 See supra Part III(B). 
 191 Moringiello, False Categories, supra note 19, at 135. 
 192 Id. at 138. 
 193 Id. at 165. 
 providing a general pro-
2011] COLLATERAL DAMAGE 99 
vision to reach all general intangibles offers certainty to secured credi-
tors while giving an interim remedy if a new form or mechanism of 
enforcement is needed or preferable.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The lack of standard remedies for intangible assets such as do-
main names, electronic assets and forms of intellectual property rights 
undermine the overall purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
rapid evolution of technology has challenged legislators and legal 
scholars alike. What was once referred to as the “crown jewel” of the 
UCC,194 renowned for its expert simplicity and accredited for the 
growth of financial markets in the later 
STEVEN CHANG
 century has fractured into a 
conglomeration of asset-by-asset enforcement provisions which rely 
on rigid state law remedies that adhere to ancient, antiquated writs.  
Virtual, intangible property is the E-Commerce of the future. In-
tellectual property and intangible property are becoming the most 
valuable assets of modern corporations, and Internet companies and 
technology are rapidly replacing the brick-and-mortar companies of 
old. The Uniform Commercial Code must adapt broader provisions to 
foster this unprecedented growth, or else risk becoming another antiq-
uity in the rising virtual age of E-commerce. 
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 194 Harris & Mooney, supra note 12, at 1401. 
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